Daily Reading Comprehensions For CAT 20 July 2026

I remember the first time someone told me that I could not be whoever I wanted to be. I was in high school, and the dream-buster was my piano teacher. At a lesson one day I made some sort of offhand joke about going to Juilliard and becoming a professional musician. My teacher, a wiry man in his mid-sixties, looked at me wryly over his glasses and said, ‘Uh, no.’

I had never taken my piano lessons very seriously. I played for fun, and I was under no illusions about how talented a musician I was (answer: not very). But it was still a shock to hear someone tell me that there were limits to who I could be. I was a teenager, trying to navigate the messy business of discovering who I was as a person. Up to that point, identity had felt like such a private journey: I alone determined who I was. Yet here was my piano teacher, pointing out that, in a lot of ways, who I was wasn’t up to me. Society could open doors, if it deemed me worthy, but it could also slam them in my face. I may not have particularly wanted to become a musician, but I wanted to be able to become a musician. So I was confronted with a deep question that remains with me to this day: how much say do we really have over who we are?

Broadly speaking, there are two philosophical camps. On the one hand, there are the existentialists. According to them, we ourselves are the authors of our own identities. Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, insists that for humans ‘existence precedes essence’. We do not have an essence until we give ourselves an essence. In short, ‘man first exists: he materialises in the world, encounters himself, and only afterward defines himself.’ I define myself.

On the other hand, there are feminist philosophers. In their view, who you are doesn’t come about by individual fiat. Instead, your identity is determined by social forces. As Iris Marion Young says: ‘our identities are defined in relation to how others identify us …’ Cressida Heyes agrees: ‘None of us are at liberty to become any kind of person we want, and to align oneself with a particular identity formation is a necessarily intersubjective activity.’

In my view, both camps are correct because they are referring to two different kinds of identity: metaphysical identity and existential identity. Metaphysical identity has to do with who you are, as a frank and straightforward matter of fact. There is some fact of the matter about whether one is a firefighter or a schoolteacher, Christian or Muslim, Canadian or Swedish. It might not be that all of these facts are immediately obvious to a passing observer, but they are the sort of thing you could learn about a person by learning about their behaviours, relationships or history.

Here is a fresh set of 4 advanced, CAT-level Reading Comprehension questions based on the provided passage, utilizing diverse conceptual testing formats with no arrows and short options where specified.

Q1. The primary conceptual friction the author experiences during the high school piano lesson is rooted in the realization that: Correct Option 2 … Explanation: Before the teacher's comment, identity had felt like a "private journey" where "I alone determined who I was." The shock came when the teacher pointed out that "who I was wasn't up to me. Society could open doors but it could also slam them in my face." The core friction is that individual self-authorship is ultimately dependent on whether external institutions deem a person worthy. Option 1 introduces unmentioned professional jealousy. Option 3 sets up an abstract contradiction not present in his teenage realization. Option 4 is factually incorrect — he explicitly states he "played for fun" and had no illusions about his low talent. Hence, option 2.Q2. The author's tone when introducing his own philosophical synthesis regarding the two competing intellectual camps can be best described as: Correct Option 2 … Explanation: After mapping out two seemingly incompatible philosophical traditions — the existentialists and the feminists — the author introduces his own thesis: "In my view, both camps are correct because they are referring to two different kinds of identity: metaphysical identity and existential identity." Rather than taking a side, the author seeks to harmonize the two perspectives by showing how each applies to a distinct conceptual dimension of identity. This makes his stance nuanced and reconciliatory. It lacks the aggression of option 1, the negativity of option 3, or the detached apathy of option 4. Hence, option 2.Q3. Based on the author's definition of "metaphysical identity" as a "frank and straightforward matter of fact" observable through behaviors and history, which of the following real-world scenarios best exemplifies this specific form of identity? Correct Option 2 … Explanation: The passage defines metaphysical identity as "who you are, as a frank and straightforward matter of fact," giving examples like being a firefighter or a schoolteacher — "the sort of thing you could learn about a person by learning about their behaviours, relationships or history." Option 2 perfectly captures this — an empirical matter of fact verified by history (employment record) and active behavior (operating the engine). Options 1 and 3 describe purely internal desires or essences without any manifest behavioral or historical facts. Option 4 describes an attempt to ignore factual behavioral history. Hence, option 2.Q4. According to the passage's characterization of the two philosophical camps, which of the following pairings accurately matches a school of thought with its core conceptual view of human identity? Correct Option 3 … Explanation: The text explicitly states that according to the existentialists, "we ourselves are the authors of our own identities." Citing Sartre, it notes that "man first exists: he materialises in the world, encounters himself, and only afterward defines himself." This matches option 3 perfectly. Option 1 misattributes the feminist concept of "intersubjective activity" to existentialism. Option 2 reverses Sartre's maxim ("existence precedes essence") and misattributes it to feminism. Option 4 invents an extreme activist goal for feminist philosophers completely absent from the text's descriptive focus on social forces. Hence, option 3.