Daily Reading Comprehensions For CAT 16 November 2026

On the evening of 8 September 1930, the German mathematician David Hilbert stepped up to a microphone in Königsberg and addressed his countrymen by radio. He was 68, recently retired, and at the height of his fame. The talk was a defence of pure reason, delivered in the city of Immanuel Kant, and it ended with two phrases that would later be carved on his tombstone: Wir müssen wissen. Wir werden wissen. We must know. We shall know.

Are certain questions closed to the human mind? Are there truths about the world that we can never know? Hilbert thought that, at least within mathematics, this could not be the case. For him, mathematics was a game played with symbols: one could fix the right axioms as rules of the game and every mathematical problem could be solved. He was wrong.

The day before his Königsberg address, at a small academic meeting in the same city, a 24-year-old Austrian named Kurt Gödel had quietly announced that no such system for arithmetic could exist. Whatever reasonable set of rules you fix, something true must lie beyond them and thus beyond our knowledge. We can’t know. We won’t know. Gödel’s results, known as the Incompleteness Theorems, are landmark achievements of 20th-century logic. Recent work in philosophy and mathematics has begun to illuminate the gap they opened, and with it something deeper about the foundations of knowledge itself. The story begins in the same city, but two centuries earlier.

When Kant remembered a book by David Hume he’d read years earlier, he was woken from what he called his ‘dogmatic slumber’. Kant had believed that pure reasoning could teach us every absolute truth about the world, but Hume had asked a question that that stumped him: what reason do we actually have to believe that the future will resemble the past? We may have seen the Sun rise a thousand times, but how do we know it will rise tomorrow? The belief that the future will resemble the past is, Hume argued, merely a kind of habit. Kant couldn’t answer Hume’s challenge and was silenced for a decade.

When Kant finally broke his silence with the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), he offered a radical answer. We can know the world only as it appears to our minds, and that is where our science sits; the noumenal world – the Ding an sich (the ‘thing-in-itself’) – simply lies beyond our reach. Causation is not something we discover in the world, but something the mind supplies for experience to be coherent at all. When we watch a cat push a glass off a table, we don’t see a bare sequence of motions and then infer, by some metaphysical principle, that the push caused the fall. No: we see the push as causing the fall. The causal structure is not a hypothesis we add to the experience; it is part of how the experience comes to us in the first place. It is in our minds already.

Q1. Based on the details provided in the passage, place the following historical and intellectual milestones in correct chronological order, from EARLIEST in time to MOST RECENT: (1) Kurt Gödel quietly announces his results demonstrating that no complete axiomatic system for arithmetic can exist. (2) Immanuel Kant publishes the Critique of Pure Reason to break his decade-long intellectual silence. (3) David Hilbert delivers his radio address in Königsberg concluding with "Wir müssen wissen. Wir werden wissen." (4) David Hume challenges the rational basis for believing that the future will resemble the past, waking Kant from his "dogmatic slumber." Correct Option 1 … Explanation: Event 4: David Hume challenged induction prior to Kant's Critique (mid-18th century). Event 2: Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 after a decade-long silence. Event 1: Kurt Gödel announced his results at a small academic meeting in Königsberg on 7 September 1930, the day before Hilbert's address. Event 3: David Hilbert delivered his radio address on the evening of 8 September 1930. Thus, the chronological order is 4, 2, 1, 3. Options 2, 3, and 4 misorder either the 18th-century philosophical timeline or the relative order of Gödel's announcement and Hilbert's radio address. Hence, option 1.Q2. David Hilbert's philosophical belief—that every mathematical problem could be solved by fixing the right set of axioms as rules of a symbolic game (Paragraph 2)—relies on which of the following underlying assumptions? Correct Option 4 … Explanation: Hilbert believed mathematics was a game played with symbols where one could fix the right axioms as rules of the game and every mathematical problem could be solved. For this premise to hold, one must assume that a complete and formal set of axioms can exhaustively produce and prove every mathematical truth within that system. Option 1 confuses Hilbert's formalist view of mathematics with Kantian empirical/noumenal philosophy. Option 2 brings in Gödel's theorem as an assumption of Hilbert's, whereas Gödel's work actually disproved Hilbert's assumption. Option 3 claims human language cannot express axioms, which directly contradicts Hilbert's belief in axiomatic formal systems. Hence, option 4.Q3. According to Kant's formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason (Paragraph 5), what can be logically inferred regarding human knowledge of causality when observing physical events (such as a cat pushing a glass)? Correct Option 1 … Explanation: Paragraph 5 explains that in Kant's view, causation is not something we discover in the world, but something the mind supplies for experience to be coherent at all. We do not infer causality from bare motion; rather, the causal structure is not a hypothesis we add but part of how the experience comes to us in the first place. The noumenal world (Ding an sich) remains beyond our reach. Option 2 summarizes David Hume's view of habit (Paragraph 4), which Kant explicitly sought to replace. Option 3 directly contradicts Kant's assertion that the noumenal world lies beyond human reach. Option 4 asserts that humans can know the "thing-in-itself," which Kant explicitly denied. Hence, option 1.Q4. How does the author contrast David Hilbert's declaration ("Wir müssen wissen. Wir werden wissen") with Kurt Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems? Correct Option 3 … Explanation: Paragraph 2 states that Hilbert believed every mathematical problem could be solved. Paragraph 3 contrasts this directly with Gödel's landmark discovery: whatever reasonable set of rules you fix, something true must lie beyond them and thus beyond our knowledge. We can't know. We won't know. Option 1 reverses the two thinkers' positions and introduces nonsensical claims about radio broadcasts. Option 2 scrambles Kant's Ding an sich and Hume's solar example into a false comparison. Option 4 incorrectly attributes Hume's concept of habit to Hilbert and introduces unmentioned poetry. Hence, option 3.