Daily Reading Comprehensions For CAT 10 June 2026

In his novel Penguin Island (1908), Anatole France spins a wonderful tale about a blind old monk who sets off from Brittany on a mission to the Hebrides and lands on an island inhabited only by penguins. Though the birds speak a strange language, he assumes they must be human beings. So he proceeds to baptise them.

When the news of this reaches heaven, it causes a major stir. God himself is embarrassed. He gathers an assembly of clerics and doctors, and asks them for an opinion on the delicate question of whether the birds must now be given souls. It is a matter of more than theoretical importance. ‘The Christian state,’ St Cornelius points out, ‘is not without serious inconveniences for a penguin … The habits of birds are, in many points, contrary to the commandments of the Church …’ After lengthy discussion, they settle on a compromise. The baptised penguins are indeed to be granted souls – but, on St Catherine’s recommendation, their souls are to be of small size.

For the penguins, souls were an unexpected bonus. As René Descartes, the philosopher-scientist of the 17th century, had explained, nonhuman animals in general, in a state of nature, are mere soulless machines. Here’s a sketch of a Cartesian penguin, without even a smidgen of a soul.

Descartes believed that humans too are machines of a kind. But he held that, with humans, thankfully, God has arranged the addition of a soul as standard practice. Early in infancy, the material substance of the human brain is put into communication via the pineal gland with the separate substance of the mind: res extensa (extended stuff) is joined by res cogitans (thinking stuff). The consciousness that results lays the foundation for the soul.

Today, we may think such ‘substance dualism’ laughable. A century and a half after Descartes, the great French essayist Denis Diderot was certainly laughing. ‘A tolerably clever man,’ he wrote in 1780, ‘began his book with these words: “Man … is composed of two distinct substances, the soul and the body.” … I nearly shut the book. Oh! ridiculous writer … you do not know what it is that you call soul, less still how they are united.’

Yet, by around 1838, Charles Darwin had apparently not seen the joke. ‘The soul,’ he wrote in one of his youthful scientific notebooks, ‘by the consent of all is superadded, animals not got it.’

Should we laugh? Or should we as contemporary scientists show some understanding? As I see it, it is not as clear-cut as many of us would like to believe. To the contrary, anyone who looks objectively at the natural history of human beings might well conclude that Descartes and the young Darwin were pretty much on target. Anthropology, psychology, religion, philosophy, art, all suggest that the possession of a soul – founded on consciousness – is part and parcel of being human. Perhaps it was Diderot who was being ridiculous.

Q1. The author's own view, as expressed in the final paragraph, is best described as: Correct Option 1 … Explanation: The final paragraph is the author's pivot from surveying others' positions to staking their own. The language is carefully hedged — "as I see it," "might well conclude," "perhaps" — but the direction is clear: the author pushes back against the assumption that Diderot's mockery of dualism represents obvious progress. The claim that "it is not as clear-cut as many of us would like to believe" is a challenge to scientific complacency, not an endorsement of Descartes. Option 2 overstates — the author does not endorse substance dualism, only questions its dismissal. Option 3 is the opposite of what the author says. Option 4 introduces a comparison between Darwin's notebooks and later work that the passage never makes. Hence, option 1.Q2. Why does the author include Diderot's mocking quotation about the writer who divides man into soul and body? Correct Option 3 … Explanation: Diderot's quote is the high-water mark of anti-dualist confidence in the passage — he doesn't argue against soul-substance, he simply laughs at it. The author then immediately notes that Darwin, just decades later, "had apparently not seen the joke," and closes by asking whether it was actually "Diderot who was being ridiculous." Diderot functions as the straw man of Enlightenment certainty that the author's final paragraph dismantles. Option 1 is wrong — Diderot is presented as representative, not authoritative. Option 2 generalises beyond what one quotation supports. Option 4's literary-versus-scientific contrast is invented, not present in the passage. Hence, option 3.Q3. The passage ends with the question: "Perhaps it was Diderot who was being ridiculous." Which of the following, if added as the very next sentence, would be most consistent with the passage's argument and tone? Correct Option 4 … Explanation: The author's closing move links soul to consciousness — "the possession of a soul founded on consciousness." The passage's implicit argument is that consciousness is not a solved problem, and therefore dismissing the soul as laughable is itself intellectually reckless. Option 4 extends this logic precisely — if consciousness is mysterious, soul-language may capture something real. Option 1 concedes to the Diderot camp, contradicting the author's direction. Option 2 is whimsical and deflates the philosophical tension the author is building. Option 3 rehabilitates Darwin's later position, which the passage does not suggest. Hence, option 4.Q4. A philosopher argues: "The question of what separates humans from animals is not theological but neurological — it lies in the complexity of the prefrontal cortex, not in any immaterial substance." Based on the passage, which character or thinker would most likely find this argument satisfying, and which would most likely resist it? Correct Option 1 … Explanation: The philosopher's argument is purely materialist — it locates human distinctiveness in brain structure, not soul or consciousness. This is precisely Diderot's camp: the soul is a confused concept, the body and brain are all there is. The passage's author, by contrast, ends by questioning exactly this confidence — suggesting that soul-as-consciousness is genuinely meaningful. Option 2 is backwards — Descartes would resist materialism, not embrace it. Option 3 is plausible for Darwin but St Catherine's concern was about penguin souls specifically, making this a category mismatch. Option 4 is wrong on both counts — St Cornelius was concerned with practical inconvenience to penguins, not the neurology-versus-theology debate. Hence, option 1.