Daily Reading Comprehensions For CAT 01 June 2026

India and US find themselves facing each other at a fascinating inflection point. Washington is confronting realities that many in US preferred to postpone. Trump has had a distinctly underwhelming summit with Xi in Beijing. There was little meaningful concession from the Chinese, but there was a sobering acknowledgement in Washington that US is dealing with a genuine peer competitor. US finds itself without the leverage it needs to compel China to play by some rules. Instead, China has gamed globalisation on its own terms. The appeal of “sasta-and-sundar” Chinese products concealed a more uncomfortable reality: of weaponised supply chains and strategic dependencies.

Trump faces a similar strategic dilemma in Iran to the one Nixon and Kissinger confronted in Vietnam in the early 1970s. In a prescient essay in Foreign Affairs, Gideon Rose argues that “Like the fate of South Vietnam, the ultimate fate of the Iranian nuclear programme, along with that of the Iranian regime itself, will end up being decided another day.” The Trump administration is relearning a lesson that great powers periodically forget: wars are often won or lost not by the ability to inflict pain, but by the capacity to absorb it. Military superiority matters, but endurance matters more.

Third, US is finding itself with fewer friends. Pakistan remains a familiar tactical partner. Others continue to engage Washington selectively. Yet the broader sense of confidence in American leadership has eroded. It may also explain why PM Modi may not be considering a trip to the White House anytime soon, notwithstanding Rubio’s invite.

US is revisiting a recurring theme in its history: the temptation of splendid isolation. It wants greater protection at home and fewer burdens abroad. Trump is not an aberration so much as a product of these domestic pressures and voter preferences. Yet, recent strategic setbacks suggest that isolation may be harder to achieve than many Americans imagine. A country cannot easily detach itself from the world when it remains deeply dependent on its principal adversary for manufacturing capacity, critical inputs, and supply chains. A strategic rethink in Washington may, therefore, be inevitable.

For India, these developments offer both cautionary lessons and opportunities. Resilience is not built overnight. It’s embedded in industrial systems, and baked into economic, technological, and regulatory policies. India is learning this lesson in real time.

At the bilateral level, the investments that India and US have made in each other over decades cannot disappear overnight. US remains one of the largest sources of FDI into India. American capital, technology, and higher education continue to matter enormously. Indian companies still see US as their most important market, and a crucial source of validation for innovation. None of this is likely to change.

What India needs instead is a sophisticated “plus one” strategy. Japan and India are already moving in that direction. Australia is also seeking reliable partners. This is why Quad remains vital for India. It’s not in India’s interests to allow the ‘Indo-Pacific’ to slide back into the narrower ‘Asia-Pacific’ framework. Such an outcome would hand China a significant strategic victory.

Q1. According to the passage, the reference to Nixon and Kissinger's experience in Vietnam is primarily used to illustrate which of the following points regarding the US's current situation in Iran? Correct Option 3 … Explanation: The passage draws a direct parallel between Vietnam and Iran, followed by the lesson that "wars are often won or lost not by the ability to inflict pain, but by the capacity to absorb it. Military superiority matters, but endurance matters more." Option 3 accurately captures this concept of endurance. Option 1 is incorrect — the passage states military superiority still matters, but endurance matters more. Option 2 introduces "diplomatic concessions," which is not mentioned in this context. Option 4 is an overgeneralization not supported by the specific analogy. Hence, option 3.Q2. Why does the author argue that the US's historical temptation for "splendid isolation" will be "harder to achieve than many Americans imagine"? Correct Option 2 … Explanation: The answer is explicitly stated in the passage — "a country cannot easily detach itself from the world when it remains deeply dependent on its principal adversary for manufacturing capacity, critical inputs, and supply chains." Option 2 perfectly summarizes this structural roadblock to isolationism. Options 1, 3, and 4 mention concepts present in the text but incorrectly link them as the reason why isolation is hard to achieve. Hence, option 2.Q3. Based on the passage, it can be inferred that sliding back from an 'Indo-Pacific' framework to an 'Asia-Pacific' framework would hand China a "significant strategic victory" because: Correct Option 2 … Explanation: The term "Asia-Pacific" historically centers on East Asia, often marginalizing India's role, while "Indo-Pacific" explicitly includes the Indian Ocean and India as a central player. By reverting to "Asia-Pacific," India's strategic importance is diminished, removing a key democratic counterweight to China. Option 1 is incorrect as US-India bilateral ties are stated to be deep and unlikely to change overnight. Options 3 and 4 contain extreme exaggerations and misinterpretations of the text. Hence, option 2.Q4. Which of the following best captures the central theme of the passage? Correct Option 2 … Explanation: The first half of the passage discusses the US's shifting global realities — struggles with China, Iran, eroding leadership, and the temptation of isolationism. The second half discusses what this means for India: building resilience, maintaining strong bilateral ties with the US, but also pursuing a "plus one" strategy to diversify. Option 2 perfectly captures this dual narrative. Option 1 ignores India entirely. Option 3 wrongly links India to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Option 4 misrepresents the passage, which explicitly states that the US "remains one of the largest sources of FDI" and that this is not likely to change. Hence, option 2.